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Abstract 
 
 GDP accounts are customarily compiled in several alternative ways, each aggregating 
transactions in different ways, but all (at least in theory) adding to the same total.  Two of the 
most common aggregations are that focused on expenditures (based on the standard national 
income accounting identity of C + I + G + X - M) and that based on revenues, or incomes.  The 
two methods should, of course, add to the same number since they measure different sides of the 
same activity:  what money people receive on the one side, and what they do with it on the other. 
However, Bulgarian GDP statistics using the revenue approach give growth rates 2 
percentage points lower than the expenditure approach for 1998 and 1999.  In other words, data 
based on what people actually spend show growth rates of 5.4% (1998) and 4.4% (1999), while 
official figures based on revenues are 3.5% and 2.4%, respectively.  This can be interpreted as 
evidence that there are underreported incomes.  It is of interest not only for statistical but also for 
economic policy purposes to have more detailed information about the discrepancies between 
official statistics and activities not covered by the official statistical system.  It is particularly 
interesting to know the size and structure of unreported, hidden economic activities, or what has 
come to be called the “shadow economy.”  Currently published estimates of the size of the 
shadow economy vary from 20 to 25% of officially measured GDP, implying that this is a far 
larger issue than that implied by the differential growth rates cited above. 
The objective of this study is to estimate the size of the informal sector, its structure, and 
the dynamics of its development since Bulgaria ended its long standing centrally directed 
command economy.  Different methods were used to get results that are compatible for 
international comparisons; also, alternative calculations allow a range of estimates which can 
help to balance the methodological weaknesses of the individual approaches. 
 The basic rationale of Physical Input Approaches to measuring the size of the shadow 
economy is that energy consumption (electricity, plus other sources) in a given country is 
proportional to total economic activity and any change in energy consumption which does not 
correspond to changes in the measured total activity level of the country indicates a change in the 
size of the shadow economy.  These results provide useful indicators of changes in the shadow 
economy over time, but cannot be used to quantify its absolute size since this depends on an 
initial estimate of its size in the base year.  This estimate is necessarily arbitrary to some degree 
in the absence of specific micro-level data allowing definition of an explicit relationship between 
energy use and economic activity.  Results show that the Bulgarian shadow economy in 1998 
declined below the estimated base year (1989) share of 30%.  According to our calculations the 
share of the shadow economy in 1998 GDP in Bulgaria was 22%.  The largest shares were 
observed in 1990 (32.2%) and 1996 (34.4%), declining thereafter. 
 This study has shown that though the size of the shadow economy has declined from its 
peaks in the mid 1990’s, it remains a sizable portion of the Bulgarian economy.  While in many 
ways shadow activities have the potential to be dynamic growth sectors, bringing them into 
official economy would help spread the burden of social programs more broadly.  Our results 
show that a substantial portion of the response to policy initiatives is effectively hidden from 
official view.  Thus, an ability to correctly estimate the size and structure of the shadow economy 
will not only provide more accurate statistics but can help improve growth policies as well. 
I. Introduction1 
 
It has been reported in the popular press that statisticians assume in their analyses 
approximately 9 trillion USD of world-wide output is not reported,2 largely due to the 
existence of the shadow economy3.  Friedrich Scheneider4 concludes that shadow activity is 
nearly 15% of officially reported world GDP based on research carried out in 76 developed 
and emerging economies.  This shows that the informal sector can be as important as the 
official economy, especially when it accompanies the economic development of the transition 
countries. According to an estimate made by Johnson, Kaufman and Zodia-Lobaton5 the 
shadow economy in the transition countries varies between 7 - 43% for the period 1989-1993. 
There are many causes for the existence of the shadow economy, but some of the most 
important can be readily identified. These are high tax burdens, weak banking systems, 
business regulations and legislation, inefficiency of government institutions, and high 
unemployment rates. The shadow economy tends to be greater in the developing and 
transition countries due to more corruption and low incomes. 
To date there is no precise definition of the shadow economy.  Schneider and Enste 
define it as a multitude of activities that are not reported by the official statistics.  According 
to Feige6 the development of the shadow economy is due to regulations and rules imposed on 
business by the state.  De Sato7 has also contributed to the explanation of the shadow 
economy phenomenon.  He holds that the quality of regulations as well as their enforcement 
are of great importance for the development of the shadow economy and emphasizes the 
change in the attitude of economic agents towards institutions and the legislation, especially in 
the transition countries. 
Philip Smith8 has referred to the unofficial economy as "market-based production of 
goods and services, whether legal or illegal that escapes detection in the official estimates of 
GDP."  However, this description is almost as broad as the term shadow economy.  An 
alternative possibility is to define the concept in terms of its causes or indicators - a more 
detailed classification has therefore been given by Schneider and Enste9 who divide 
                                                          
1 The team would like to extend special gratitude to the experts from the Agency for Socio-Economic Analysis, 
especially Docho Mihaylov, Director for carrying out the field work and initial analysis, Ms Evdokiya Nikolova - 
a student at Harvard University, for contributing to the first chapter of the report, as well as to Dr. Friedrich 
Bauersachs, Senior Economist at the Institute for Market Economics for his comprehensive consultations during 
preparation of the final report. 
2 The Shadow Economy, The Economist, August 28, 1999, Vol. 352. 
3 IMF estimated global GDP in 1998 was 39 trillion USD, almost 9 trillion USD (9*1012) of activity equivalent 
approximately to the American output went undetected, ibid. 
4 Schneider, Friederich and Dominic Enste, Shadow Economies Around the World – Size, Causes, and 
Consequences, Jena, 1999. 
5 Studies of Illegal and Unreported Activity (Michigan: WE Institute for Employment Research, 1996) and 
Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 53. 
6 See: Philip Smith, Assessing the Size of the Underground Economy. The Canadian Statistical Perspectives, 
Canadian Economic Observer, Catalogue number 11- 010, 18 March 1994. 
7 See: de Sato The Other Path, NY: Harper & Row, 1989.  Sato's formulation is based on the cases formulated in 
the context of Peru's economic development (that Peru is governed by a set of laws that are relatively less 
efficient that those that guide the informal sector). 
8 Philip Smith (1994): "Assessing the size of the Underground Economy: the Canadian Statistical Perspective", 
Canadian Economic Observer, Catalogue No.: 11-010, 3.16-33, at 3.18. 
9 Friedrich Schneider and Dominic Enste (1999): "Shadow Economies Around the World—Size, Causes, and 
Consequences", Lectiones Jenenses, Heft 20, 9. 
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underground economic activities in several categories by three factors:  monetary and non-
monetary transactions; illegal and legal activities.  Legal activities are further divided into 
those associated with tax evasion or tax avoidance10.  A good way to generalize these 
definitions would be to think of shadow economic activities as those which provide a way to 
avoid taxes. 
For the last three years the development of the Bulgarian economy has been 
characterized by macroeconomic stability and financial soundness.  At the same time the state 
has extended control over business activities by increasing the number of the legal regulations 
concerning licensing, permissions and registration.  Current licensing and registration 
procedures impede business activity and create favorable conditions for corruption in state and 
local administration.  Surveys of the Institute for Market Economy in Sofia show that business 
regulation and constantly changing regulations are important reasons for firms to prefer the 
informal sector of the economy11. 
In theory and practice the most common methods for measuring the shadow economy 
are the following: 
The direct approach12 is based on a direct inquiry with the firm managers, state and 
local administration representatives by means of interviews and questionnaires.  An advantage 
of this method is the variety of the information collected about the structure of the shadow 
economy, and the incentives that lead to it.  The outcome of such research depends on the way 
the questionnaire is formulated and the willingness of the businessmen to give truthful 
answers.  The disadvantage of the approach is the degree of reliability of the information 
given the illegal nature of many shadow activities.  This presents difficulties for estimation of 
the actual size of the shadow economy.  For this reason, the direct approach is not much used 
in practice. 
Commonly used indirect methods for estimation are based on differences between 
national expenditures and revenues, an assessment of the labor market analyzing the 
differences among the officially registered employment, the unemployment rate and the 
number of people who are actually employed within the economy13. 
Another indirect method is the currency demand approach14 used in the estimation of 
the informal economy in OECD countries by Schneider, Johnson, and Kaufman.   In the past 
few years an assessment of the shadow economy through energy consumption costs has been 
applied by Kaufman and Kaliberda15.  This method is appropriate for comparative analyses.  
The physical (electricity) approach has been applied by Johnson and Lacko to the transition 
countries for the period 1989-1995.  According to this method, the size of the shadow 
economy in GDP for Bulgaria was 26.1% (1989-1990), 32.7% (1990-1993) and 35% (1994-
1995).   
                                                          
10 Schneider and Enste, 9. 
11 See: In Search for Growth: Policies and Lessons from Bulgarian Transition, IME Newsletter, Vol. 5, No 11-
12, 1999. 
12 The direct approach is used by Isachsen Krovland and Storm (1982) for the estimation of the SE in Norway 
and Denmark. 
13 See Friedrich Schneider and Domonic Este,  "Shadow Economies Around the World- Size, Causes, and 
Consequences, Max-Planck-Institute for Research into Economic Systems, 1999. 
14 The currency demand approach has been used by Cagan (1958) and further developed by Vito Tanzi (1980-
1983). 
15 See: Kaufman and Kaliberda, The Underground Economy in Poland. 
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The objective of the analysis reported in this paper is to estimate the proportion of the 
informal sector in the economy, its structure, and the effect on the economic growth of the 
economy.   
 
II.  GENERAL METHODS FOR EVALUATING SIZE AND EFFECTS 
OF THE SHADOW ECONOMY 
 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
In order to become a member of the EU Bulgaria has to show strong and sustainable 
GDP growth to catch up with the lowest income economies in the Union.  If research on 
shadow activities proves a high relative share of shadow economy to official GDP, this 
finding can reveal an important resource for economic growth and the number of years needed 
for convergence to the EU average would be drastically reduced.  Government measures can 
be targeted toward improving the business environment and removing administrative barriers 
to small and medium enterprises (SMEs).   
Reducing the tax burden, which is usually associated with the main motive for being in 
the shadow economy, can decrease the costs for firms to stay in the shadow sector.  This will 
increase the tax base significantly and improve the tax collection ratio.  Though these are 
benefits and costs to informal operations, on the macro level the total effect of the SE in 
Bulgaria should be negative because companies cannot use various public and private 
services. The most obvious example is the tendency to avoid the bank services.  This results in 
reduced volume of sales, especially for exports.  While the shadow sector may be quite 
flexible on local markets, it is less competitive on external markets.  The negative impact of 
the SE on national competitiveness is the main disadvantage for a small economy like 
Bulgaria, which should have an export-oriented policy.  Monitoring key economic statistics, 
we can point out the following indicators that suggest a high level of the shadow economy in 
Bulgaria and justify our survey on the subject: 
1. The transition from planned to market economy. Following the collapse of the 
planned economy in the late 80’s, the newly established private sector is concentrated in the 
service sector in the form of SMEs.  These are characterized by frequent changes of main 
activities, non-bank sources of financing, short business history and institutional gaps. This 
makes the work of the NSI (National Statistical Institute) extremely complicated as it is 
practically impossible to cover the fast moving private sector, even if it is official and legally 
operating.  In addition, with the transition to a market economy, the NSI has had to introduce 
a new system of national accounts and operate in a totally different environment from that 
which existed under the old regime. 
2. In kind production.  This is very important in rural areas, but significant in kind 
production is also found in the big cities, especially in the service sector.  It is a traditional 
phenomenon for Bulgaria and quite typical for planned economies when the quality and 
variety of goods and services was poor.  In depth estimates of the share of in kind production 
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are presented in the annual report of the AEAF16 for 1997 and estimate that about 10-20% of 
household incomes come from in-kind production (20-40% for rural areas and 5-10% for 
large towns).  These activities are difficult to calculate in the official GDP figures, and serious 
underestimation is likely to exist. 
3. Different outcomes from expenditure and income approaches for GDP.  One of 
the indicators for the existence of a shadow economy is the different result that comes from 
the expenditure and income approaches for measuring the GDP.  While in accounting terms 
these methods should produce equal results, in the case of Bulgaria the approach that sums 
sectoral value added gives growth rates about 2 percentage points lower than the expenditure 
approach for 1998 and 1999.  In other words, the expenditure approach shows 5.4% and 4.4% 
GDP growth for 1998 and 1999 respectively, while official numbers are 3.5% and 2.4%.  This 
is probably the consequence of the firms’ tax avoidance.  
4. Aging population and high social insurance burden.  The dependency ratio for 
Bulgaria (the ratio of the pensioners to employees) is very high − the highest of all applicant 
and member countries of the EU.  In combination with the pay-as-you-go pension system the 
incentives to avoid the social insurance burden are enormous.  Typical practice for SMEs is to 
pay taxes on the legally required minimum wage and deliver the rest of the remuneration 
unofficially.  Though the share of the private sector in gross value added is 65.3% for 1999 
and 63.3% in the total number of employees, the revenues to the National Social Insurance 
Institute amount to much less than 50% (official numbers not published). 
5. Currency substitution. During the financial crises of the early 1990’s and 1996-
1997 a large share of national savings was transformed into foreign currency.  Some of the 
transactions were made in foreign currencies and the phenomenon seems to have persisted.  
With the introduction of the currency board just a small amount of   
de-dollarization took place in the short run.  Around 50% of total bank deposits are held in 
foreign currency, chiefly United States dollars (USD).  The prices of real estate are still quoted 
in USD.  USD are still offered in the exchange offices as their rates (adjusted for a variety of 
commissions and fees) for buying and selling USD have been continuously below the official 
rate of the central bank. 
6. Geographical situation and cross-border trade.  Bulgaria is situated on the 
junction of many international roads associated with legal or illegal traffic of goods and 
people.  Many unregistered transactions and incomes are not adequately covered in the official 
statistics, which can be also a factor for the immense supply of foreign currencies. 
Various methods have been created to estimate the size of the shadow economy of a 
country17.  Among the most widely used have been the currency demand approach, the 
physical input (electricity) approach and different survey (direct) approaches.  In Bulgaria only 
the indirect approach based on currency demand has been used so far.  Under the assumption 
that underground transactions are made with cash payments, an increase in the demand for 
currency would be translated into an increase in the shadow economy.  A currency demand 
function is built with all possible factors affecting demand, and estimated econometrically 
                                                          
16 See "Bulgaria 1997 Economic Survey", Agency for Economic Analysis and Forecasting, Sofia, 1998, part 3: 
"The crowding out effect of the economy in kind over the market economy", p. 28. 
17 For a detailed description of each method along with its shortcomings and applications in different countries, 
see Schneider and Enste, 1999. 
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over time.  Then an estimate of the SE is given by the difference in the money demand when 
the tax burden and government regulations are at their lowest and highest levels. Note that we 
have no way of assessing the unofficial activities unless we assume a constant velocity of 
money over time and within the official and unofficial sectors. 
In Bulgaria, a study of the transactions demand for money was conducted by Nenovsky 
and Hristov of the Bulgarian Central Bank18.  In the concluding section of their paper they 
estimate the size of the Bulgarian Shadow Economy using the following procedure: 
1.  Tax burden is approximated by the ratio of Taxes to Total Consumer Expenditure. 
2.  Money used in the Shadow Economy equals the difference between money demand 
with and without taxes. 
3.  The velocity of money is assumed to be the same in the shadow and the official 
economy.  
4.  After computing the portion of money in transaction used in the shadow economy 
(C) as a percentage of the one used in the official economy, consumer expenditures 
in the unofficial sector are the product of this quantity of money and velocity:  
 
Equation 1 
 
VCE *=  
 
Consumer expenditures are 80% of GDP, so underground income is calculated as 
 
Equation 2 
 
8.0
EYshadow = . 
 
The shadow economy is thus calculated on a monthly basis starting from the middle of 
1997, yielding averages of 15.2% for 1997, 35.3% for 1998 and 24.1% for 1999. 
There are a number of problems with the money demand approach in general - a 
comprehensive list has been given in Schneider and Enste,19 a part of which is reflected in the 
points below: 
1) The approach does not capture unofficial activities in which money does not exchange 
hands, eg., barters.  
2) Tax burden is often assumed to be the main cause of shadow economy, thus if there 
are other significant factors, the result would be an underestimate. 
3) Changes in money demand might not necessarily translate into changes in the size of 
the shadow economy: the former might be due to a slowdown in demand deposits. 
4) As mentioned above, the velocity of money may not be constant, and moreover it may 
not be the same in the official and unofficial sectors.  While this is a major weakness 
of the model, as Nenovsky and Hristov acknowledge, it is difficult to measure the 
                                                          
18 Nikolai Nenovsky and Kalin Hristov (1999): "A Study of the Money in Transaction after Establishing the 
Currency Board in Bulgaria," working paper, Bulgarian National Bank. 
19 Schneider and Enste (1999), 48-50. 
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velocity of money in the official economy, and impossible to measure it in the 
informal economy.  However, without an assumption for this variable, the analysis 
cannot proceed.  In practice, the authors suggest that money changes hands more 
quickly in the shadow than in the official sector, which results in an underestimate of 
the shadow economy size. 
5) In the particular case of Bulgaria, the instability of the Bulgarian lev (BGN) has 
prompted the use of foreign currency, mainly US dollars and German Marks, yet the 
portion of it to the amount of Bulgarian currency circulating in the shadow economy is 
impossible to estimate.  If we suppose that the value of dollars or marks is at least as 
much as the one of the BGN, then the black market estimates would double, becoming 
30%, 70% and 48% respectively for 1997-99. 
The general objections to the money demand approach are quite important in the case 
of Bulgaria.  The bank crisis in 1996 led to a dramatic fall in bank assets as well as in the 
money multiplier and money velocity.  This practically makes the money demand approach 
useless for Bulgaria, as the key assumption of constant velocity does not hold.  Table 4 
included in the appendix shows the velocity of money, calculated for M3, has increased from 
1.54 in 1992 to 4 in 1997.  It is only possible to analyze the period after the introduction of the 
currency board (July 1, 1997) as done in the above survey. 
Compared with GDP, the drop in total assets was followed by a drop in domestic 
credit.  The level of bank intermediation was reduced, and it is not possible to distinguish 
between the reasons for the increased cash transactions and the dollarization of the economy.  
It would definitely be mistaken to attribute it only to the shadow economy, since the normal 
reaction of economic agents would be to avoid the unstable bank system and to prefer cash 
transactions.  During the three year period of macroeconomic stabilization, confidence in the 
banking system is in a process of slow recovery.  It is inevitably accompanied by a decrease in 
money velocity and the assumption of constant velocity can provide inaccurate estimates of 
the shadow economy even for the last three years of financial stabilization.  For these reasons, 
we believe that the physical input approach is a much better tool for evaluation of shadow 
activities in Bulgaria.  It also provides a longer time series for comparison of the current 
situation with the pre-transition period. 
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III.  ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATION: THE PHYSICAL INPUT APPROACH 
 
Given the problems with the Money Demand approach, we turn to an alternative 
macro-estimation of the shadow economy in Bulgaria using energy consumption.  Among 
those who have previously used this approach are Kaufmann and Kaliberda20.  We also try to 
measure the total economic activity level (TA) in Bulgaria by assuming that the 
electricity/energy consumption in the country is proportional to the total activity TA.  Thus, 
any change in energy consumption which is not matched by a corresponding change in the 
total activity level in the country, should reflect a change in its shadow economy (SE) level.  
In other words, the growth in the ratio of energy to total activity is an indicator of the growth 
in the parallel markets of a country. We can then establish a formula for the level of the 
shadow economy as a percentage of the GDP which we denote by SE. 
 
By our assumption of constant proportion of energy to total activity, 
Equation 3 
base
base
nn E
TAETA *=  
where subscripts n and base stand for the base year and the year in question, and E denotes 
Energy (or Electricity) consumption. We also have 
 
Equation 4 
1−=−=
Y
TA
Y
YTASE  
where Y is the country’s GDP, let baseSE = x be the fraction of shadow economy of GDP in the 
base year. Then 
Equation 5 
base
nbase
base
base
nn
basebase
E
EY
x
E
xY
ETA
xYTA
*
*)1(
)1(
*
)1(
+=
+
=
+=
 
                                                          
20 Daniel Kaufmann and Aleksander Kaliberda (1996): "Integrating the unofficial economy into the dynamics of 
post socialist economies: A framework of analyses and evidence," Washington, D.C., The World Bank, Policy 
research working paper, 1691. 
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So for the shadow economy in year n we have: 
Equation 6 
1/*)1(
1
−



+=
−=
n
n
base
base
n
n
n
n
E
Y
E
YxSE
Y
TASE
 
 
From the formula we see that, ceteris paribus, the shadow economy is determined both 
by the level of the shadow economy in the base year and the ratios of GDP to energy 
consumption in the base and given years.  Note that here the term base year simply refers to 
the starting year of our calculations, and once we know the shadow economy in a given year, 
and the relevant statistics for energy consumption and GDP, we can recursively find the 
shadow economy levels for the subsequent years.  Unfortunately, this convenience of easy 
calculations also underlies the shortcoming of the method.  We can never find an absolute 
value for the shadow economy size without using some exogenous estimate for its size in the 
base year. 
In case we are only interested in how a change in the shadow economy in the base year 
alters the shadow economy in the current year (say we want to see how robust our calculations 
are in case the level of shadow economy in the base year is allowed to vary within a range of 
error), then the formula for changes follows from above by subtraction: 
Equation 7 
 




=
∆
n
n
base
base
n E
Y
E
YIxUSE /*  
 
We now see that, holding everything else constant, the change in the SE in any given 
year is proportional to the change in SE in the base year.  The coefficient of proportionality, 
however, is not necessarily 1  it depends on the ratios of GDP to energy consumption in the 
base as well as the current year. 
As mentioned above, E in the formulae could either refer to energy or electricity 
consumption.  The standard approach considers electricity consumption in the economy as a 
whole.  In the current paper we try to make the measures of shadow activities more precise by 
looking at total energy consumption as well; also we deviate from the standard approach in 
that we compute the shadow economy size separately in the different sectors.  We believe that 
the latter is the best way to capture the structural changes that have been taking place 
extensively in all transition economies since the change of regimes. 
We thus compare four modifications of the Physical Input approach: by looking at 
electricity consumption separately for sectors, and as a whole to compare with the standard 
approach and existing results; we then compute equivalent values by replacing electricity with 
total energy consumption.  The latter should reflect the substitution effect that takes place 
among the energy sources when their prices change relative to the corresponding CPI and 
inflation rates. 
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ELECTRICITY - TOTAL CONSUMPTION AND CONSUMPTION BY SECTORS 
 
The advantage of the electricity approach is the accuracy of the data for electricity 
consumption.  The standard method considers only total electricity consumption in the 
economy.  However, when significant structural changes take place, economic production can 
shift from energy intensive industrial sectors to services or agriculture, which are 
characterized by low or zero electricity consumption. In the case of Bulgaria this process 
cannot be ignored. 
Assuming a constant GDP/electricity ratio with 1989 as a base year, we test the 
assessment of the shadow economy with the standard approach and structural adjustments. 
We use real GDP data that we compute based on the Bulgarian GDP in 1989 and indexes of 
GDP growth for the years 1989-1998.  Assuming a "base" level x of the shadow economy in 
1989, we use the available data for GDP and electricity consumption to generate estimates of  
the levels of the shadow economy in the years 1990-1998.  For example, since the GDP levels 
for 1989 and 1990 are respectively 39,579 and 35,977 while the Electricity consumption 
levels are 38,816 and 47,528 respectively, by formula (1) the shadow economy in 1990 is 
 
Equation 8 
1347.1*)1(1
528,47
977,35/
816,38
579,39*)1(
1/*)1(
1990
1990
1990
1990
−+=−


+=
−



+=
xxSE
E
Y
E
YxSE
base
base
 
 
Similarly, we proceed to find the levels for subsequent years.  Finally, we need an 
estimate for the shadow economy in the base year, x.  Since it is difficult to give a precise 
value for that, we consider a range of possible values and show that while the trends in the 
shadow economy growth are the same regardless of the starting values, some of these starting 
points result in negative estimates of SE/GDP for some years, and so are likely to be too low21. 
To adjust the estimation for the structural changes, we divide the GDP into two 
sectors: industry and other.  We take the ratio of value added to electricity consumption for 
each sector and calculate the shadow economy by sectors.  In Table 1 the data for the sectoral 
approach is calculated for a uniform distribution of the shadow economy by sectors in the base 
year.  Figure 1 shows how these methods differ for a given base year level of the SE.  Below 
we test how asymmetric distribution by sectors can affect the final results. 
                                                          
21 See appendix. 
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Table 1 
Electricity Approach, Share of Shadow Economics in GDP  
under Alternative Base Year Estimates of SE/GDP 
 
 Standard Sectoral  Standard Sectoral  Standard Sectoral 
1989 20.0 20.0  25.0 25.0  30.0 30.0 
1990 61.9 24.5  68.7 29.6  75.4 34.8 
1991 56.2 16.6  62.7 21.2  69.2 25.9 
1992 56.1 23.5  62.6 28.1  69.1 32.7 
1993 61.4 30.9  68.1 35.6  74.8 40.3 
1994 57.3 28.1  63.8 32.7  70.4 37.4 
1995 70.1 75.1  77.2 81.5  84.3 88.0 
1996 31.8 49.7  37.3 55.1  42.8 60.5 
1997 30.4 48.5  35.8 53.9  41.2 59.2 
1998 16.6 36.0  21.5 40.8  26.4 45.6 
 
 
When calculating the relative shares of shadow economy, the final results are strongly 
dependent on the assessment for the shadow economy in the base year.  Such an assessment 
can be quite misleading, but regardless of the initial share the dynamic trends are not affected.  
The graph below shows estimates for different scenarios for the base year. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
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The advantages of the sectoral approach are that we have additional figures for the 
shadow economy by sectors, and we can distribute the concentration of the informal activity 
by sectors.  In this study we have disaggregated the GDP figures into two sectors: industry and 
others (including services and agriculture).  The data for agriculture and services is reliable on 
an aggregated level, but on a disaggregated level is strongly biased by the form of ownership.  
In 1989 most agricultural production was concentrated in the state owned co-operative farms, 
and the consumption of electricity was adequately counted for the sector.  With the land 
restitution, these state farms were liquidated and production was thereafter attributed to small 
private farms.  In most cases these are individual households and their electricity consumption 
is counted as household consumption.  This is also true for most of the micro firms operating 
in the service sector.  The relative shares of the shadow economy to GDP can also vary with 
different scenarios for the distribution of shadow economy by sectors in the base year.   
In Table 2 and Figure 2 we show calculations for different sectoral distribution of the 
relative shares.  However intuition suggests that in the case of Bulgaria, the share of shadow 
activities in the industrial sector is much lower than it is in the service sector.  The reasons are 
both methodological failures that do not allow the statistical institutions to capture the total 
activity in the service sector and the flexibility of the service sector to underreport revenues 
for avoidance purposes.  It is also important to note that in the base year 1989 the methods 
used for calculating GDP did not accurately cover many  services, since the government 
supplied most of them at zero cost to the consumer. 
 
 
Table 2 
Sectoral Approach, SE/GVA (%), Sectoral Approach  
with Different Assumptions for the Distribution of SE by Sectors in Base Year 
 
 Total 
(uniform) 
 
Industry 
 
Others 
 
Total 
 
Industry 
 
Others 
 
Total 
1989 25.0 10.0 46.9 25.0 30.0 17.7 25.0 
1990 29.6 15.8 49.2 30.2 36.8 19.6 29.5 
1991 21.2 13.5 35.6 22.7 34.2 8.7 20.8 
1992 28.1 6.2 73.5 30.5 25.5 39.0 27.3 
1993 35.6 6.0 106.2 39.3 25.3 65.3 34.4 
1994 32.7 2.9 102.5 36.0 21.6 62.4 31.7 
1995 81.5 19.8 236.0 91.6 41.6 169.3 78.2 
1996 55.1 27.0 134.5 59.8 50.1 88.0 53.6 
1997 53.9 23.7 134.1 59.6 46.2 87.7 52.0 
1998 40.8 15.1 107.6 45.2 36.1 66.4 39.3 
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Figure 2 
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ENERGY APPROACH 
 
The electricity approach is based on the empirical assumption that the ratio of GDP to 
electricity consumption is constant.  In the long-run changes in relative prices of energy 
resources or other supply side effects can force the consumers to substitute different sources 
of energy.  (See Figure 3)  The substitution effect can seriously affect the assessment of the 
shadow economy. 
 
Figure 3 
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To calculate a better estimate of the shadow economy, we compare the consumption of 
total energy sources, including electricity, coals, fuel, gas, and heating, calculated in 
terajoules.  The decrease in energy consumption is even greater than the drop in electricity.  
This means that some of the consumers have shifted from other sources of energy to 
electricity, leading to changes in the ratio of GDP to electricity and overestimation of the 
shadow activity.  Accordingly, to improve the quality of the physical input approach, we 
substituted total energy consumption for electricity in the calculations outlined above.  This 
method is a reliable tool to remove any substitution effects that might distort the estimates.  A 
slight concern in using the total energy approach is the probability of statistical errors in the 
energy consumption data and the chance that hidden consumption may exist for some sources 
such as kerosene, diesel or petrol. 
 
Figure 4 
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In order to calculate the actual sizes of the Bulgarian shadow economy in the years 
1990-1998, we need to know the level for the base year 1989 (see formula (1) above).  There 
exist estimates in the economic literature, yet given the inaccurate and contradictory results 
those yield, we allow for a range of possible values of the shadow economy level in 1989.  
Thus, as in the electricity approach above, we can get a sense of what ranges the shadow 
economy levels move in and see that the trends in these levels are unaffected. 
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Figure 5 
Shadow Economy Levels for the Years 1989-1990 in Bulgaria, 
Based on  Different Values for the Shadow Economy in 1989 
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Figure 5 shows that regardless of the initial level of the shadow economy in 1989, the 
pattern of change across the years of transition is, of course, identical.  However, it is also 
clear that the lowest three estimates for initial values generate negative results in the middle 
years.  This gives some basis for accepting higher initial estimates for SE/GDP. 
However, before accepting these results we must consider that just as with the 
standard electricity approach, the above results suffer from omission of the sectoral changes in 
the economy.  If we believe that the black markets flourish most in the service (and 
agricultural) sectors and least in industry, and consider the fact that the participation of 
industry in the Bulgarian GDP has almost halved since 1989 while the agricultural sector has 
stayed almost the same, we can see how such distortion can significantly modify the overall 
results. 
We refine the method of looking at total energy consumption by considering energy 
consumption in the different sectors.  For correspondence to the electricity results, we break 
the economy into the same two sectors, industry and everything else (service and agriculture).  
The difference in results between the standard and sectoral approach is shown in Figure 6 for 
a shadow economy of 25% in the base year. 
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Figure 6 
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Table 3 
Energy Approach, SE/GDP (%) 
 Standard Sectoral Standard Sectoral Standard Sectoral 
1989 20.0 20.0 25.0 25.0 30.0 30.0 
1990 21.9 22.0 26.9 27.1 32.0 32.2 
1991 -2.9 2.8 1.1 6.8 5.2 10.8 
1992 -10.0 3.7 -6.2 8.0 -2.5 12.4 
1993 -7.5 11.8 -3.7 16.5 0.2 21.3 
1994 -9.0 8.6 -5.2 13.0 -1.4 17.3 
1995 -6.7 13.3 -2.8 17.5 1.1 21.6 
1996 4.3 24.8 8.6 29.6 13.0 34.4 
1997 -1.5 19.5 2.6 23.8 6.7 28.2 
1998 -8.0 12.8 -4.1 17.4 -0.3 21.9 
 
 
 
With the above four methods we capture the structural change and substitution effects 
that Eilat and Zinnes22 proposed as a way to reflect changes in efficiency (in use of electricity) 
by considering the changing fraction of the private sector over time.  We already include a 
partial estimate of efficiency in the sectoral division of the shadow economy.  Private 
ownership has the largest share in the service sector in the economy, so to an extent its growth 
is accounted for in the growth of the service sector in the Bulgarian GDP, and the latter we 
capture in our new sectoral approach. 
 
                                                          
22 Eilat, Yair and Clifford Zinnes, The Evolution of the Shadow Economy in Transition Countries: 
Consequences for Economic Growth and Donor Assistance, CAER Discussion Paper No. 83, September 2000.  
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The physical input approach provides easy estimates of SE trends, but it is not a 
precise tool.  Energy consumption can be biased by different factors that affect final results as 
we see in the case of Bulgaria.  The energy approach can be more reliable for economies with 
stable growth paths, which do not witness dramatic structural shifts.  However, for transition 
economies like Bulgaria, the energy consumption approach as well as the currency demand 
approach should be used only as an indicative measure of SE dynamics.  We believe that 
some structural factors of the traditional electricity approach are eliminated with our sectoral 
approach when we use total energy consumption instead of electricity consumption.   
We believe the most reliable method that can be used as an indicator for the shadow 
economy is the total energy approach by sectors.  Calculations from this method show that the 
shadow economy in 1998 has declined below the level of the 1989 base-year level.  If we take 
what we believe as a realistic assumption of 30% level of SE in 1989, the SE economy in 
1998 as a share of official GDP should be 22%.  The absolute peaks of the shadow activity are 
calculated for 1990 (32.2%) and 1996 (34.4%).  Since 1996 we observe a declining trend in 
the relative share of the shadow economy.  This is not surprising given the fact that the 
introduction of the currency board in mid-1997 marked a steady rise of tax revenues to GDP.  
The high inflation period of 1990-1995, the hyperinflation in 1996 and the beginning months 
of 1997 boosted the nominal tax revenues at a much faster rate than social compensations, 
thus creating strong incentives for households and businesses to escape from the official 
economy. With macroeconomic stabilization and the accompanying price and trade 
liberalization, the shadow economy has shrunk. The process, however, succeeded only 
partially, as administrative and the tax burdens remain the main influence for businesses to 
operate in the informal sector. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table 4 
Selected Indicators of the Bank Sector in Bulgaria 
(From 1991 until 1995, SSB is not included) 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Non-performing 
credits (%) 
    
55.50 
 
74.10 
 
74.00 
 
21.20 
 
13.40 
 
13.40 
Assets/GDP*  2.28 2.23 1.80 1.13 1.30 0.32 0.35 0.35 
Velocity of M3*  1.54 1.53 1.58 1.76 2.25 4.00 3.55 3.50 
Money multiplier 3.77 - 4.75 4.92 4.55 5.31 2.77 2.76 2.86 
Credits/GDP (%)  100.38 107.10 89.58 66.93 75.63 20.89 21.60 20.0 
 
* Note:  The bank assets cover both local and foreign currencies, but M3 does not include 
foreign currencies in cash outside the banks, as the BNB does not assess the amount of foreign 
currencies used for cash transactions or cash saving 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Electricity Consumption (in kWh) 
  
Total 
Agriculture 
+ Forestry 
 
Industry 
 
Construction 
 
Households 
 
Others 
1989 38,816 1,069 20,773 994 10,183 5,797 
1990 47,528 994 19,149 896 10,475 5,116 
1991 42,000 866 14,925 606 10,405 3,226 
1992 38,899 686 13,173 421   9,685 3,856 
1993 39,628 556 12,353 382 10,021 4,722 
1994 39,306 563 12,793 304   9,806 4,672 
1995 43,750 539 14,075 356 10,956 15,185 
1996 30,479 600 13,236 251 11,486 4,906 
1997 28,031 355 11,355 303   9,882 6,136 
1998 25,960 233 11,049 265 10,540 3,873 
Source:  Bulgarian Statistical Abstract, various years 
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Table 6 
Electricity Consumption (in kWh) 
  Total Agriculture Industry Service/Others 
1989 38,816 1,069 21,767 15,980 
1990 47,528 994 20,045 15,591 
1991 42,000 866 15,531 13,631 
1992 38,899 686 13,594 13,541 
1993 39,628 556 12,735 14,743 
1994 39,306 563 13,097 14,478 
1995 43,750 539 14,431 26,141 
1996 30,479 600 13,487 16,392 
1997 28,031 355 11,658 16,018 
1998 25,960 233 11,314 14,413 
Source:  Bulgarian Statistical Abstract, various years 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Electricity Consumption (in kWh) - Two Sector Division 
 Total Industry Others 
1989 38,816 21,767 17,049 
1990 47,528 20,045 16,585 
1991 42,000 15,531 14,497 
1992 38,899 13,594 14,227 
1993 39,628 12,735 15,299 
1994 39,306 13,097 15,041 
1995 43,750 14,431 26,680 
1996 30,479 13,487 16,992 
1997 28,031 11,658 16,373 
1998 25,960 11,314 14,646 
Source:  Bulgarian Statistical Abstract, various years   
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Table 8 
Real GDP - Total and by Sectors 
 Agriculture Industry Services GVA GDP 
1989 4,394.000 23,507.000 11,742.000 39,643.000 39,579.000 
1990 4,231.422 20,568.630 11,213.610 36,013.657 35,977.310 
1991 4,413.373 16,249.210 10,451.080 31,113.671 32,955.220 
1992 3,760.194 15,209.260 7,639.743 26,609.201 30,549.490 
1993 2,624.615 14,266.290 7,685.581 24,576.486 30,091.240 
1994 2,873.954 15,122.270 7,447.328 25,443.549 30,632.890 
1995 3,290.677 14,305.660 7,745.221 25,341.563 31,521.240 
1996 3,047.167 12,617.600 7,024.916 22,689.679 28,337.590 
1997 4,049.685 11,191.810 5,669.107 20,910.600 26,353.960 
1998 4,106.381 11,673.060 5,697.453 21,476.889 27,276.350 
Source:  Bulgarian Statistical Abstract, various years 
Note:  The above figures were calculated from indexes for GDP growth  
from 1989 to 1998 (1989=100) and actual levels of GDP for 1989. 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 
Two-Sector Division of GDP 
 Industry Other GVA GDP 
1989 23,507.0  16,136.0  39,643.0  39,579.0  
1990 20,568.6  15,445.0  36,013.7  35,977.3  
1991 16,249.2  14,864.5  31,113.7  32,955.2  
1992 15,209.3  11,399.9  26,609.2  30,549.5  
1993 14,266.3  10,310.2  24,576.5  30,091.2  
1994 15,122.3  10,321.3  25,443.5  30,632.9  
1995 14,305.7  11,035.9  25,341.6  31,521.2  
1996 12,617.6  10,072.1  22,689.7  28,337.6  
1997 11,191.8  9,718.8  20,910.6  26,354.0  
1998 11,673.1  9,803.8  21,476.9  27,276.4  
Source:  Bulgarian Statistical Abstract, various years 
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Table 10 
Energy Consumption in Bulgaria (in terajoules) 
  
Total 
Agriculture
+ Forestry 
 
Industry 
 
Construction 
 
Households 
 
Other 
1989 773,551 - 437,640 - - - 
1990 714,096 39,955 379,848 23,170 156,986 114,137 
1991 521,006 31,929 283,541 12,818 121,422 71,296 
1992 448,004 22,775 212,529 9,767 140,612 62,321 
1993 453,259 17,844 204,229 7,166 155,797 68,223 
1994 454,094 18,852 220,836 7,077 139,423 67,906 
1995 478,974 16,433 250,251 6,676 142,587 63,027 
1996 481,382 18,121 244,879 6,134 148,323 63,925 
1997 422,798 14,799 223,793 5,678 123,628 54,900 
1998 408,846 13,674 186,196 4,395 136,609 61,661 
Source: Bulgarian Statistical Abstract, various years 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 
Energy Consumption in Bulgaria (in terajoules) - Two Sector Division 
 Total Industry Other 
1989 773,551 437,640 335,911 
1990 714,096 403,018 311,078 
1991 521,006 296,359 224,647 
1992 448,004 222,296 225,708 
1993 453,259 211,395 241,864 
1994 454,094 227,913 226,181 
1995 478,974 256,927 222,047 
1996 481,382 251,013 230,369 
1997 422,798 229,471 193,327 
1998 408,846 190,591 211,945 
Source: Bulgarian Statistical Abstract, various years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 
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Bulgarian Shadow Economy Levels Based on a Range of Possible Levels in 1989 
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Source: Figures for electricity consumption and real GDP from the tables above, and 
calculations by formula (1) in the text; x = level of the shadow economy in 1989. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 
Shadow Economy Levels Based on the Same Range 
of Possible Levels of the Shadow Economy in 1989 as Above 
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Source: Figures for electricity consumption and real GDP from the tables above, and 
calculations by formula (1) in the text; x = level of the shadow economy in 1989. 
 
 
Figure 9 
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Shadow Economy Levels Based on a Range of Possible 
Values for the Shadow Economy X in the Base Year 1989 
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Source: Figures for energy consumption and real GDP from the tables above, and 
calculations by formula (1) in the text; x = level of the shadow economy in 1989. 
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Figure 10 
Shadow Economy Levels, Computed by Estimating the Shadow Economy 
in the Industry and Non-Industry Sector of the Economy 
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Source: Figures for energy consumption and real GDP from the tables above, and 
calculations by formula (1) in the text; x = level of the shadow economy in 1989. 
 
 
 
